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This paper examines the fundamental orientation guiding the Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) activities in the voluntary report published by Samarco – a 
Brazilian mining company, identifying how the company perceives itself regarding 
a severe environmental disaster occurred in 2015. Our analysis applied Basu and 
Palazzo's (2008) model based on an organizational sensemaking process to explain 
how the organization expresses its thinking, how it discusses and acts to cope with 
the accident expectancy and its consequences. We analyzed the reports that depict 
the tailings dam collapse, observing whether the risks and damages to the ecosystem 
would be mentioned and anticipated to the stakeholders. Our evidence points out 
that the company had not disclosed beforehand any relevant information about the 
real hazards or critical impacts of its operating activities. After the accident, Samarco 
seems to maintain its relational posture towards society.  However, the practical 
actions signal that the company is after its own business. 
1 INTRODUCTION
A long list of scandals and frauds has led firms to aim at portraying a more socially responsible image, 
causing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to continue to be at the center stage of management accounting 
research (Richter & Arndt, 2018). According to Matten and Moon (2008), many organizations have systematically 
started proactive efforts to adopt practices that show their active and constructive role within societies. 
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O artigo examina a orientação intrínseca que orienta as atividades de Responsabilidade 
Social Corporativa (RSC) nos relatórios voluntários de sustentabilidade publicados 
pela Samarco, mineradora brasileira, identificando como a empresa se percebe em 
relação ao sério desastre ambiental ocorrido em 2015. Nossa análise aplicou o modelo 
de Basu e Palazzo (2008) baseado em um processo de entendimento organizacional 
para explicar como a empresa expressa seu pensamento, como ela o discute e como 
ela atua para lidar com as expectativas e consequências do acidente.  Analisamos 
os relatórios que retratam o colapso da barragem de rejeitos, observando em que 
extensão os riscos e prejuízos ao ecossistema seriam antecipados e mencionados aos 
stakeholders. Nossas evidências mostram que a empresa não antecipou qualquer 
informação relevante sobre os perigos reais ou impactos críticos de suas atividades 
operacionais. Após o acidente, a Samarco parece manter sua postura relacional com 
a sociedade. Entretanto, as ações práticas indicam estar cuidando de seus próprios 
interesses.
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Financial analysts and regulatory agencies would consider the evidence of our 
analysis on the case of Samarco disaster to be aware of whether companies facing 
high environmental risks anticipate and communicate such risks to stakeholders. 
Additionally, the sensemaking framework could be useful to analyze how such 
companies are considering risks and consequences, and therefore make sense of 
future accidents and how they would cope with them.
Practical Implications
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However, recent events, such as the cases of British Petroleum in the Gulf of Mexico and Samarco in 
Brazil increase the need for better monitoring on business activities and on companies attempts to legitimize 
themselves as ‘CSR companies’.
In order to understand why companies undertake specific actions, for instance how they anticipate or 
react to environmental jolts, it is essential to identify the shared organizational understanding (Georgieva, 2012, 
p. 5). The shared understanding is collective constructed through the "sensemaking" process, that means how the 
organization makes sense of an unknown event (Weick, 1995, p. 4), coming up with plausible understandings and 
meanings (Weick, 2001). Sensemaking is inherently collective (Weick & Roberts, 1993), and it includes actions 
to cope with the unknown situation (Weick et al., 2005). Consequently, one can understand how the company 
is engaged to CSR practices observing how they react to critical events (Basu & Palazzo, 2008, p. 26), as the 
organizational sensemaking is being developed and registered on companies’ reports, internal communication, 
chats, etc. 
This paper examines the CSR sensemaking process, analyzing the intrinsic orientation that guides CSR-
related activities in its voluntary sustainability reporting. We adopted the model of Basu and Palazzo (2008) to 
identify how the company defines its CSR and perceives itself concerning stakeholders and its purpose in business 
as a result. The case is the Samarco disaster occurred in 2015, when a tailing dam operated by Samarco – a 
Brazilian mining company - collapsed, one of the most critical environmental accident occurred in Brazil.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the potential contribution to the literature, 
with an extensive review of Basu and Palazzo's model. We applied the concept of CSR by analyzing the case of the 
Brazilian company’s behavior in a severe environmental disaster, which results in a CSR incongruence between 
sustainability discourse and practice. After explaining the methodology and presenting our results, we discuss our 
findings in light of the extended framework and conclude by discussing limitations and reviewing the contributions 
of this study.
2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Organizations carry and increasingly need to deal with expectations from society and stakeholders 
about their social and environmental impacts (Cramer, Van der Heijden & Jonkern, 2006). Corporate Social 
Responsibility reports (CSR) communicate the sustainable practices and the explanations which the organization 
selects to share to a broad audience. As there is a positive effect related to the jobs created and to the regional 
economic development (Georgieva, 2012, p. 13), the presence of organizations is positive, but they also carry 
responsibilities with local communities and the environment.
The CSR report, as a type of disclosure, would be an act of releasing all relevant information about a 
company, providing useful elements for stakeholders’ decision-making concerning its activities risks in its reports. 
However, even when these reports are an inevitable part of an organization’s communication, there may still be 
some events that seem to conflict with stakeholders' perception and expectation. In order to show definite evidence 
of their industrial activities, companies try to include sustainability and CSR into their business policies (Basu & 
Palazzo, 2008, p. 15). Notwithstanding, it is possible to observe differences between the published CSR report and 
the daily company practices. 
The use of too much energy and time, and too many resources in the CSR activities, as well as the 
fulfillment of certain standards, are not enough to configure the company’s right sustainable posture (Georgieva, 
2012, p. 13). Furthermore, the detection of a negative deviant drives CSR engaged organizations to publish useless 
information about their activities not to impair their social image (Greene, 2012). Therefore, companies do not 
represent the real organizational sense about their activities (Singh, Connaughton & Davies, 2015).
The company and the stakeholders are involved in a continuous process of understanding their business 
context, implications, opportunities and mutual expectations. They are continuously triggered to make sense 
of novelties, unknown events, and uncertainties. During such collective process, called “sensemaking” process 
by Weick (1995, p. 4), individuals from many stakeholders involved and affected by an unknown event will 
converge for a plausible understanding and meaning for such event (Weick, 2001). Such process also includes the 
development of “plausible images that rationalize what people are doing" and enables individuals in organizations 
to rationalize both everyday happenings and out-of-the-ordinary experiences (Weick et al., 2005, p. 409). The 
individuals inside the organization will interact, negotiate and create a collective meaning and understanding about 
a “coherent account of the world” in which it is enrolled (McNamara, 2015).  
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The CSR report, similarly, represents how an organization understands its interaction with the external 
environment regarding social responsibility and sustainability. The CSR is a type of an “internally and externally 
shared frame of reference concerning CSR objectives, activities and results" through which the company 
systematically creates and recreates its posture regarding social responsibility and sustainability (Nijhof & 
Jeurisen, 2006, p. 319).
The CSR report is related to the sensemaking process in two ways. First, it affects the organization’s 
legitimacy from relevant stakeholders, as investors, regulatory agencies and society (Jackson, 2010, p. 5). The 
annual CSR reports are a representation of what the organizations believe their market wants to hear, and so 
are used to promote themselves (Castelló & Lozano, 2011); what the organization chooses to promote about 
themselves (Singh, Connaughton, & Davies, 2015). Consequently, the communication applied to CSR report is a 
critical cultural and symbolic resource for an organization to develop and convey the sense that they have made 
(Alvesson, 1993). Second, it is part of a conflict with the internal understanding of its sustainability posture. Once 
the organization published these reports, the disclosure of the accurate information of the firm's CSR has to make 
sense for them, as organizations will pursue the objectives defined under the labels and categories exposed by the 
CSR report rather than what is hidden or poorly documented (Singh, Connaughton & Davies, 2015).
Some organizations espouse a commitment to society and the environment but run their business decisions 
and actions not aligned with their commitments; there is a perceived gap between the construct of their reality and 
their action (Christian, 2004; Conley & Williams, 2005). As sensemaking exists in the interplay between "action 
and interpretation" (Greene, 2012, p. 38), such gap could be used to analyze the sensemaking process (Greene, 
2012, p. 43-44). More than “simply analyzing the content of its CSR actions within a certain context or over a 
certain period of time",  "studying CSR through the lens of sensemaking — which might include motivation for 
CSR as one of its surface representations — as a feature of a firm's general organizational character” (Basu & 
Palazzo, 2008, p. 6).
Sensemaking studies cover a great variety of topics and use different methodological approaches. The 
construction of meaning is an interpretative process, where the meaning and significance of things are generated 
by words, sentences, and conversations used by organizations (Faria, 2017, p. 175). Through the sensemaking 
activity, stakeholders may close the loop of their understanding and interpretation on differences between actions 
and expected outcome, and create individual cognitive maps, ascribing specific interpretations to observed actions, 
events, and outcomes (Brown & Hyseni, 2012; Alexander, 2004). This stimulates reflection on aspects not observed 
in everyday organizational practices and emphasizes connections between action and communication to uncover 
the organizational reality (Montenegro & Casali, 2008, p. 12). 
We adopt the model proposed by Basu and Palazzo (2008). For those authors, the Annual Sustainability 
Report can be analyzed as a determinant of CSR, to examine not only actions for sustainability but also the 
chaining of these initiatives related to the decision-making process in business management. Figure 1 will present 
the relevant sensemaking process dimensions in CSR process model by Basu and Palazzo (2008, p. 8), within three 
broad domains: i) cognitive; ii) linguistic; and iii) conative.
Figure 1. CSR Dimensions of the Sensemaking Process
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Basu and Palazzo (2008, p. 43) and Georgieva (2012, p. 18)
The cognitive domain is about “legitimacy” and “identity” or how the organization thinks on the adequate 
way to interact with their stakeholders and with the external world (Basu & Palazzo, 2008, p. 9-12). Companies have 
to explain the way they think and understand on the prioritization of the common good or their business growth, 
the commitment with their business activities’ impact. On the other hand, knowing the intention of the "good 
deeds" of companies helps to understand the real meaning of facts. However, although the Annual Sustainability 
Report shows the company financial investments, it does not clarify their actual intentions. In practice, some 
companies do not fully report all the figures requested, systematically omitting some data in an attempt to expose 
the positive side and avoid giving much visibility to the information considered harmful. 
Legitimacy carries a “generalized perception or assumption that organizational activities are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 
1995, p. 577). It can be i) pragmatic; ii) cognitive; or iii) moral (Suchman, 1995, p. 571). 
When companies react to external demands by trying to convince their stakeholders of the usefulness of 
their decisions and activities, theirs goal is to gain pragmatic legitimacy. In this case, this suggests that companies 
"might monitor internal and external risks which pose a threat to its reputation" (Richter & Arndt, 2018, p. 589), 
and "are in control of their environment and can manage the legitimacy as a resource" (Georgieva, 2012, p. 19). 
On the other hand, as the cognitive legitimacy assumes that the environment controls companies, they need to 
align their actions to perceived external expectations, focusing on institutionalizing a rational discourse (Palazzo 
& Scherer 2006). Finally, moral legitimacy is about to co-create acceptable norms of behavior with relevant 
stakeholders (Georgieva, 2012, p. 19). 
Moral legitimacy is useful to the joint to a normative discourse on social issues when the company feels 
that it is losing the public trust (Palazzo & Scherer 2006). For instance, companies may engage in the development 
of local, industry-wide, or global CSR standards (e.g., within the FSC - Forest Stewardship Council - normative 
framework) or assume responsibility with regards to community, consumer, customer, supply chain, etc., or 
contribute to development and sustainable business solutions (Richter & Arndt, 2018, p. 591). In some cases, the 
moral dimension of legitimacy may be blocked due to the nature of the companies’ products, what forces them to 
try to find alternative legitimation strategies to restore the product image.
The Basu and Palazzo (2008, p.9) model also presents the "identity orientation" as an important pillar 
to interaction with stakeholders. It covers “commonly shared assumptions of what the firm is, and is expected 
to affect motivation and behavior" (Richter & Arndt, 2018, p. 589). The identity orientation can be classified as 
individualistic, relational and collectivistic (Brickson, 2005, 2007). It is not a stable concept (Brickson, 2007), as 
the organizational identity can change due to context and leadership (Georgieva, 2012). The identity orientation 
is also about the recognition of the company's identity by its employees, that is, what the company thinks of 
itself (Richter & Arndt, 2018). In the Annual Sustainability Reports, indicators on human resources and teams, 
such as appreciation of diversity, job creation, and outsourcing practices are insufficient to clarify the company’s 
assumptions and expectations about its employees; but on the other hand, it influences the employees' perception 
about its employer. 
The second dimension, linguistics, refers to the idea of communicating the reasons about ‘the why’ 
companies have committed to CSR (Basu & Palazzo, 2008, p. 8-9). The first aspect is the mode of justification; 
or how the company recognizes its responsibilities to society and stakeholders, considering the way it justifies its 
actions. The companies' communication reveals what they think about their tasks. In the Annual Sustainability 
Report, although there is financial information, if companies report their investments far beyond the minimal 
compulsory, it may mean the company is justifying them. The second aspect of the linguistics dimension is 
transparency, a measure of whether the company is willing to expose good and bad actions, even evaluating their 
possible consequences and mitigating them whenever possible. As it is difficult for companies to express harmful 
actions they may have taken, companies may highlight positive activities and reduce the visibility of harmful 
events and actions. Alternatively, companies justify the harmful impact on the environment or society through 
social projects, tax payments or royalties.
The third dimension is the conative one, or the consistency, and commitment of the posture adopted by 
companies in their activities through the persuasion perceived by their relationships (stakeholders and society 
in general) (Basu & Palazzo, 2008, p.8). Such dimension is composed of: i) posture, ii) consistency, and iii) 
commitment. The company's posture towards the criticisms and demands of its stakeholders points out how 
essential they release their image. But the company will accept society's feedback on its actions and decisions 
depending on the cost-benefit and on the coherence between its values and the emerged critics (Basu & Palazzo, 
2008, p.17). 
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Finding out how far the company engages with CSR or whether it publishes its sustainability report 
efficiently involves reviewing the consistency of its reports. This dimension, as pointed out by Basu and Palazzo 
(2008, p.19), is fundamental to understand how willing managers are to act comprehensively and systematically in 
their decision-making processes, and which could impact the effectiveness and credibility of their results. It may 
be considered: (i) when they publish the report; (ii) in what way this is being carried out; (iii) whether the company 
is actually changing its corporate culture; (iv) if it believes in the welfare of society as a whole, by investing not 
only in money but also in the propagation of sustainable ideas among its employees, in the local population, among 
the suppliers. Thus, not only is the publication of the Sustainability Report necessary to understand the companies' 
commitment to the CSR, but rather whether their actions show constancy and solidity over time.
Finally, the authors analyze the commitment extent. Evaluating whether a company is committed to CSR 
practices is not just to see if it publishes its sustainability report within GRI standards. It involves disregarding 
formalities and reflecting on the cause of the commitment and the consequences of such a decision. Is the 
publication of the sustainability report a decision that is independent of the stakeholders' attention? How much the 
proposed marketing will influence the perception of society with companies is an important issue.
Such a model was applied by Richter & Arndt (2018) in the case of Switzerland's British American 
Tobacco (BAT). They classified the company as a ‘‘legitimacy seeker,’’ characterized mainly by a relational 
identity orientation and legitimation strategies that might provide pragmatic and/or cognitive legitimacy. Another 
empirical study was run by Georgieva (2012) to the case of British Petroleum (BP).
3 RESEARCH METHOD
We employed qualitative research with content analysis to discuss the case of Samarco Mineração S.A, 
a Brazilian mining company, to explore its CSR sensemaking around an environmental disaster occurred in 2015. 
We searched for pieces of evidence on the way the company thinks, its sustainability discourse and its reactions 
when the context for its legitimacy changed due to the disaster. We adopted the framework by Basu and Palazzo 
(2008) presented in the last section.
We selected the Samarco case as an "extreme case" (Eisenhardt, 1989) through the lens of the CSR 
literature. Currently, Samarco presents a particularly severe track record in its relationships with the civil society 
due the most massive and worst environmental disaster caused by it in Brazil's history - the Fundão mining dam 
collapse in 2015, in Mariana city, Minas Gerais. To explore the case of Samarco, as a single in-depth exploratory 
case study (Yin, 2014), we applied a qualitative Content Analysis (Bardin, 2016, p. 1-42, Bauer, 2002, 192), as we 
focus on " the presence or absence of a given characteristic of content or set of characteristics in a certain fragment 
of the message" (Lima, 1993, p.54), defined as "the statistical semantics of political discourse". Such an approach 
enables a more detailed exploratory investigation to provide a comprehensive analysis of Samarco’s CSR character 
and clarify its sensemaking process. Such methodological choice joints the recent qualitative case studies which 
have examined impression management, narrative, sensemaking, and sensegiving (see Beattie, 2014). 
Why sustainability reports? Currently, the sustainability report is one of the main ways that organizations 
have to dialog with their stakeholders, presenting their ideas and actions for sustainability. Although the first 
sustainability reports just disclosed how companies' operations impacted the environment and what they did to 
address such issues (Borges et al., 2018, p. 146), nowadays they disclose information other than environmental 
information. The ideas and thoughts that emanate from the top management of the organization are disclosed in 
this report, mainly through the section where the words of the organization's president, the company's mission, and 
organizational vision and values are presented.
Therefore, it is possible that the sustainability report discloses how the CSR practices permeate every 
organization and its related parts, and the processes that affect CSR. Therefore, from the content analysis of 
Sustainability Reports, using the Basu and Palazzo (2008) model, it is possible to identify the processes that guide 
organizational sensemaking through the tripartite vision of essential processes - cognitive, linguistic and conative 
- and how the company defines and conducts its CSR, as well as perceives itself in relation to the stakeholders and 
their business purposes.  
In order to capture the CRS sensemaking, we adopted a comparative analysis and analyzed reports before 
and after the disaster of its tailings dam (named Fundão) on 5 November 2015. In its Annual Sustainability Report 
2014 , Samarco assigns itself the G4 rating (Samarco, 2014 p.2), one of the highest scores possible by the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), an international body that establishes global guidelines for its elaboration.
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Primary data on Samarco was collected in two rounds. First, the research source was defined. Then the 
"Annual Sustainability Report 2014" and the "Biennial Report 2015-2016" selected as sources for an in-depth 
understanding of the issues related to the disclosure of the Samarco's report which, for this research, should focus 
on responsible and sustainable management. The 2014 report was analyzed in its entirety as well as the 2015/2016 
report. However, the data that guided our analysis was in the presentation chapters, who we are, the vision of the 
future and the results and perspectives of the 2014 report; and in the introductory chapters, Samarco, 2015-2016 
indicators, on the breakdown of the dam. The contents of these reports were analyzed to identify keywords or 
phrases that correspond to the categories proposed in the Basu and Palazzo's framework and thus signal how 
Samarco thinks, what it says, and how it behaves.
In the second round, we selected news articles on the Internet, either on news sites or YouTube videos, 
in order to analyze Samarco's current behavior or the society's impression of its behavior, corroborated or not 
presented in its sustainability reports. Data acquiring was carried out by two researchers autonomously and 
independently and discussed and harmonized, later, by all the authors of this article, to guarantee and corroborate 
the reliability and validity of the methodological procedures and data categorization.
After completing the data collecting, with the data categorization, we analyzed and interpreted the data 
at least two times, coding the way Samarco thinks, says and acts and thus, its CSR profile. The final coding 
scheme detailed this company's profile (description of the dimensions for the CSR character) and based on the 
current news, and items were analyzed and compared with the results found at the previous stage, to corroborate 
or not Samarco's discourse. This final step was carried out together by all authors to ensure the thoroughness 
of the results. In examining our data, we followed a three-stage process of open, axial, and selective coding, 
building upon and adapting the framework of Basu and Palazzo (2008). The data collection, coding, and analysis 
procedures as well as the discussion of measures taken to ensure credibility, corroboration, and generalizability of 
our analysis and resulting findings was decided in agreement among the authors, always based on the assumptions 
present in the literature. 
Finally, we double checked journalistic information and other publicity materials with testimonials and 
interviews of the victims of the accident and the company itself, to verify whether everything the company thinks 
about and publishes about CSR in its reports is what is done and perceived by the people in the communities where 
it operates.
4 THE CASE CONTEXT
Samarco is a closed-capital joint venture controlled in equal shares by Vale S.A. and BHP Billiton Brasil 
Ltda. Founded in 1977, it operates in the Brazilian mining sector, including the manufacture of iron ore pellets 
marketed to the steel industry for about 19 countries in the Americas, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe (Appendix).
Regarding the analyses of the disaster event, Samarco stored sludge residues in a magnitude well above 
the established technical limit, using manipulated technical advice. These drainage system problems initiated from 
2000, with the entrance of mud in unforeseen areas and aggravated by the works of alteration of the massif, besides 
the accumulation of rainwater in the dam, and became an explosive fuel to provoke the tragedy in 2015 (fifteen 
years after).
In the tragedy, twenty-one people died when the dam collapsed and destroyed the district of Bento 
Gonçalves. About 700 residents were left homeless. The Brazilian government (with army, navy and air force 
actions), provided initial emergency assistance to the affected population. It was followed by the government’s 
social programs to minimize the local social damages. 
As part of the reconstruction of some structures and rehousing of people, a lengthy investigation process 
has been in place since them, for more than three years without a clear outcome regarding the responsibilities and 
sanctions. A preliminary technical opinion from the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural 
Resources (in Portuguese: IBAMA - Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais) pointed 
out that 1,469 hectares of vegetation - along 77 kilometers of watercourses, including permanent preservation 
areas - were destroyed with the dam rupture at the Mariana mine. As for the impacts on the fauna, it is impossible 
to estimate a return period of the fauna to the surroundings, aiming at the rebalancing of the species in the "Rio 
Doce" basin. Besides the suspension of water supply in the affected municipalities, the presence of metals demands 
continuous monitoring. 
In socioeconomic terms, out of the 251 sub-district buildings, 207 are in the area affected by mud, and at 
least 1,200 fishermen were affected in more than 40 cities in Minas Gerais State and Espírito Santo State. Finally, 
about 3,000 thousand employees were affected, with their jobs at stake by the closing of the company. 
Since the accident, Samarco has been prevented from operating, not engaging in any economic activity 
in the region or the country. However, it negotiated with the State Public Ministry a Term of Transactions of 
Adjustment of Conduct (TTAC) in which several actions were planned to recover the degradation caused to the 
environment, as well as the reconstruction of the city in another nearby place, aiming to resettle the population that 
had their houses hit by mud. Such a term was signed with the Federal and State Governments of Minas Gerais and 
Espírito Santo, and the recovering actions start to be coordinated by the Renova Foundation.
Samarco and its shareholders, Vale and BHP Billiton, report that they have been working with Brazilian 
federal and state authorities on an agreement aimed at the continuity of actions to remedy the social and 
environmental disaster impacts. However, IBAMA stressed that Samarco had not set deadlines allowing to monitor 
the goals and actions. For the IBAMA’s director, the Samarco’s recovery plan is "amateurish" as it does not 
stipulate the applied parameters for such R$20 billion recovery plan in 10 years. 
At the end of the day, the news agrees that Samarco has done little about the disaster recovering actions. 
Only the very first emergency actions took place and many families are still not receiving any compensation or 
help. At the time, Samarco intends to reduce its employees by 40%, or 1.2 thousand voluntary dismissals. The 
state prosecutor questioned the measure saying that the workers were the ones hit by the episode and should not be 
penalized by it. But, Samarco has not taken the blame for the accident nor disclosed the causes or reasons for the 
rupture of the dam. Its image on social media is very negative, despite its inappropriate internet campaign called 
(Somos todos Samarco - We are all Samarco) comparing the tragedy with the garbage dumped on the streets.
A recent report by the newspaper "O Globo" points out that many doubts arise about what is on the 
horizon regarding such a situation. It is difficult to know about the commitment to rebuild destroyed areas, and 
about the compensation to the victims. Even more, it is unsure whether effective actions were taken to prevent 
further disruptions in the same or other dams. It is argued that it is difficult to estimate the impacts of the mud 
destroying the Bento Rodrigues community, and of the trail of contamination left by the moving mud up to the 
sea, which compromised a huge geographical area of fauna, flora, and families. Notwithstanding, with the rainy 
season, according to IBAMA’s alert, there is a change of new pollution with mud and tailings in the Doce River .
5 INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
As the following analyses will present, the sensemaking content, for cognitive, linguistic and conative 
dimensions, is strongly permeated by the relational aspect, bringing the various stakeholders to share commitments, 
actions and consequently the subliminal responsibilities. We present each dimension and consolidate them in the 
conclusions.
Cognitive drivers
We start analyzing the Samarco's discourse, from the cognitive drivers present in the reports before 
and after the disaster of Mariana (Table 1). The company maintains similar thinking on the relationships with 
stakeholders after the disaster, what may be significantly harmful to the identity orientation of the company's 
actions. The firms with relational characteristics are perceived as partners in relationships with stakeholders, often 
exhibiting strong personal ties (Brickson, 2005). 
For instance, the keywords like "value for all", "partnership", "trust", "shared value", "open dialogue" 
in the sustainability report for 2014 point out for such relational orientation. The speech shows the partnership 
the company intends to have with those who influence or are influenced by the company, emphasizing an open 
dialogue and trust. Such relational behavior manifests itself for instance in community meetings. The concern to 
co-generate value with civil society is frequently highlighted, combining promises of long-term benefits for the 
company and for the place where it operates.
In its self-descriptions, two years after its dam collapse, Samarco recognizes that the trust, so valued 
in previous sustainable reports, has been tested and profoundly shaken. In order to regain the confidence of the 
Brazilian society, it would need significant effort to render itself in recreated company. To reinforce the "respect for 
people", it demands coherent ethical conduct and social and environmental integrated management. Such strong 
relational orientation shows its concern with a potential short-term solution to regain public trust and resume its 
activities. 
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iti
ve
  -
 W
ha
t S
am
ar
co
 T
hi
nk
s
Or
ien
tat
io
n
Individualistic Not Disclosed Not Disclosed
Relational
Value for all;
Partnership and trust;
Respect for people;
Shared value;
Open and trustworthy dialogue.
Shared value;
Respect for people;
Performance with respect for all;
Appreciation of social dialogue (impacted 
communities);
Reliable relationship with customer and 
suppliers.
Collectivistic Not Disclosed. Not Disclosed.
Le
gi
tim
ac
y
Pragmatic Not Disclosed. Economic impacts of inactivity.
Cognitive Dialogue with society. Not Disclosed.
Moral
Strengthening compliance;
Code of conduct with guidelines on ethics, 
environment, and safety;
Dissemination of good practice;
Monitoring and control of occurrences;
Contracts with clauses on security, human 
rights and the prohibition of the use of slave 
and child labor.
Transparency and compliance (compliance 
handbook);
Code of Conduct, the Corruption and Fraud 
Prevention Policy;
The Antitrust Policy;
Policy on the Giving and Receiving of Gifts 
and Hospitality;
Human rights in the value chain; Global 
Compact.
The company’s legitimation strategies, also relational in its essence, occur cognitively at the moral 
dimension, through dialogue with society. The primary emphasis of its legitimation strategies is to align its 
actions to be compatible with perceived social expectations, either through explicit public consultations or 
creation of standards to meet external expectations. One can observe that there are constant dialogues with the 
communities where Samarco acts to identify people's expectations and needs and, thus develop actions in this 
sense, characterizing its cognitive legitimacy (See Youtube, 2016a; 2016b). However, the pragmatic legitimacy 
practically reduces its possibilities of returning to operate due to civil society’s and employers’ expectation (See 
Oliveira, 2018; Globoplay, 2018; Leite 2016; Rodrigues, 2016). Moreover, the disaster significantly strained the 
cognitive legitimacy of the mining industry as a whole (See G1, 2016).
There is a strong moral influence on the development of norms of behavior and codes of conduct (e.g., 
environment, security, ethics, and human rights). After the tragedy, Samarco better specifies its set of moral 
statements linking them to external programs, looking to bring the legitimacy of external stakeholders back to the 
company. Some external sources of legitimacy used are: "UN Global Compact"; "Millennium Development Goals"; 
"Business Contributions to the Promotion of a Green and Inclusive Economy"; "Open Letter to Brazil on Climate 
Change"; and, "Brazilian Business Pact for Integrity and Against Corruption". Evidence of this type of posture 
is identified on post-disaster attitudes. An example,  in 2016 government entities agreed with Samarco, Vale, and 
BHP to establish short, medium and long-term measures to repair, compensate and remediate environmental and 
socio-economic disaster damages. Furthermore, public civil actions demanded increasing Samarco's civil liability 
regarding the disaster. 
Linguistic drivers
The company’s linguistic process (what this firm says) is about how the company may choose to respond 
to critics and justify its actions. It would be proxied through the how it interprets its responsibilities and relations 
with stakeholders (Table 2).
Table 1. Extract of Cognitive drivers adopted by Samarco in its Sustainability Reports
Source: The Annual Sustainability Report 2014 and the Biennial Report 2015-2016.
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CSR Character 2014 Report 2015/2016 Bienal Report
Li
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co
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Ju
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tio
n
Economic
It positions itself as a local development 
agent, leaving a positive legacy in the places 
where it operates. (Projects: Rural Producer 
Development Program, Citizen of the 
Future, Environmental Education Program, 
Solidarity Tax). 
Local purchases - US$1.5 billion; Taxes in 
the three areas - US$225 million; 
Expansion of jobs in the region - 16.2%; 
professional development - more than 1,400 
people in Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo; 
Delivery of various equipment items to 
Town Halls: trucks, tractors, ambulances.
Governance model of the Social 
Transformation Strategy (institutional 
articulation, basic and vocational education, 
economy and business (sustainable and 
vocational businesses), citizenship and 
social participation.
In 2015, about US$ 11 million were invested 
in projects and initiatives in the areas of 
direct influence and 2016, about US$ 4 
million.
Legal Not Disclosed. Investments made under judicial demand.
Scientific Not Disclosed.
Data from the Vox Populi Institute;
Data from the Tendências Consultoria 
Integrada.
Ethical Not Disclosed. Not Disclosed
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy Balanced No. Yes
Biased Yes. Yes
The justification adopted by the company is essentially economic oriented, but justifies benefits 
to stakeholders, reinforcing the relational aspect. Samarco adopts a pragmatic discourse trying to display the 
economic impacts of the company's inactivity. The justification focuses on the negative impacts on trade, jobs 
and employment, and on the income of the Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo States. Additionally, they employed 
a scientific oriented discourse contracting research from the Vox Populi Institute, whose the conclusion was ‘the 
majority of the population understands that Samarco should continue operating’.
The transparency is not neutral, as the 2014 Sustainability Report presents just extensive positive data 
about past results and expectation of future positive achievements. After the disaster, Samarco sought a balance 
bringing in to its report the disaster damages and the actions taken to remedy the situation. Notwithstanding, 
this report was also somehow biased, highlighting the company's achievements to the affected communities. The 
implicit objective seems to justify the importance of the company's operations in order to guarantee the "license 
to operate."
Conative drivers 
The conative CSR dimension describes how Samarco is inclined to behave and which set of actions the 
company considers as appropriate and feasible. Such actions can be analyzed by the posture, the consistency, and 
the commitment regarding the actions (Table 3).
Table 2. Extract of Linguistic drivers adopted by Samarco in the Sustainability Reports
Source: The Annual Sustainability Report 2014 and the Biennial Report 2015-2016.
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CSR Character 2014 Report 2015/2016 Bienal Report
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ow
Co
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 - 
H
ow
 S
am
ar
co
 T
en
ds
 to
 B
eh
av
e
Po
stu
re
Defensive Not Disclosed Not Disclosed
Tentative Not Disclosed Not Disclosed
Open Maintains good relations
Determined to learn from the tragedy, 
and to share those learnings globally with 
regulators and the society.
Co
ns
ist
en
cy
Strategically Coherent To “, and investment in sustainability. We are part of a process of sustainable development, beneficial to all.
Strategically Incoherent Not Disclosed Not Disclosed
Internally Consistent
The fight against corruption, respect 
for human rights and ethical business 
conduct are dealt with a compliance 
program.
They are fulfilling our duties and are open 
to collaborating with other players for the 
common good of the industry.
Internally Inconsistent Not Disclosed Not Disclosed
Co
m
m
itm
en
t Instrumental
Global Compact; the Millennial 
Development Goals; Business 
contribution to the promotion of the 
inclusive green economy; an open 
letter to Brazil on Climate Change; 
Corporate Pact for Integrity and 
against corruption.
(these codes are also associated with 
the normative aspect)
Normative Respect for people and integrity.
The basic responsibility lies in obeying 
the Term of Transactions of Adjustment 
of Conduct, using the Renova Foundation.
The 2014 Report shows actions related to environmental issues. It presents 13 new forms of environmental 
training programs defined for employees, about 1,980 listed ideas put into practice by field ideas, and about 1,790 
participants in training programs on the selective collection of household and industrial waste offered by the 
‘Samarco School of Excellence’. But they are not related to the disaster at all.
The posture, consistency, and commitment of Samarco’s actions also have a deep anchor in relational 
aspects after the tragedy. The discourse always welcomes dialogue, creating discussion forums and internal and 
external communication channels. It reflects an open posture, accessible to alternative perspectives and willing 
to share their perceptions and discuss possible changes in their operations. The posture from “good relations” 
changed to “learning from the tragedy, and sharing those learnings globally”, based on a relational focus, but 
not really undertaking the change in its operation, but just “learning .. and sharing”, as the company could play a 
relevant role globally, from guilty to reference for knowledge. Despite the open dialogue suggested in 2014 and 
2016 reports, the affected communities vigorously complain about the lack of dialogue. Thereafter, the company 
has probably a defensive stance regarding the society’ feedback on Mariana's tragedy, as the company tries to 
minimize and curb criticisms and also the perception of the damages – classifying them as minimal or derisory. 
It seems clear that Samarco intends to be strategically and internally consistent, trying to align its strategic 
plan while disseminating the social values to the employees and the others stakeholders (Samarco, 2014). However, 
after the tragedy the relational aspect has increased: Samarco is part of a process of sustainable development 
(Samarco, 2016). Such a relational aspect was not perceptible in this more individualist statement. We believe that 
Samarco drives towards a more relational identity orientation are due to the need for public confidence recovering.
The company intends to commit itself to which type of behavior or standard? For both aspects, instrumental 
and normative, the commitments are connected to relations with external stakeholders. The normative discourse 
on social issues increases moral legitimacy, as they are losing public trust. The same norms, regulations and 
external codes classified as instrumental, also strongly influence the normative commitment. Despite this, the 
normative effect of such codes demands an observation of the everyday activities and the company’s value chain. 
Table 3. Extract of Conative drivers adopted by Samarco in its Sustainability Reports
Source: The Annual Sustainability Report 2014 and the Biennial Report 2015-2016.
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The CSR sensemaking model for Samarco
Figure 2 summarizes the 3 dimensions of CSR sensemaking for the analyzed case.
6 FINAL REFLECTIONS
This article shows how effective strategies activate the intrinsic orientation that guides the responsible 
and sustainable business constructed in the Annual Sustainability Reports. Drawing on insights from Basu and 
Palazzo (2008), we focused on the Brazilian company Samarco's discourses identifying the cognitive, linguistic 
and conative aspects.
For the analyzed case, there is no consistency between what Samarco thinks, speaks and does. The 
sensemaking perspective of Samarco's Annual Sustainability Report shows that the company's discourse on the 
CSR and on sustainable management does not adequately report the events, actors, and the real context about 
the socio-environmental impact of its industrial activities. Three years after the most significant environmental 
disaster in Brazil, the scenes of this tragedy still impress. Nothing that Samarco and Renova Foundation are doing 
is of their own free will. In reality, all is the result of social pressure and a series of deals and court decisions 
(Longman & Almeida, 2018). The disaster consequences still lack an effective scaling of environmental and social 
reparations, despite difficulties in measuring  all the costs of this scourge and damages. 
The CSR sensemaking for the Samarco case suggests that the disaster and the following events are being 
interpreted as a sequence of legitimacy recovering, mostly using moral and instrumental standards of conduct 
enacted by external and powerful stakeholders. Despite the economic arguments applied in the 2016 report to 
justify the license to still be operating, the strategy to deal with such tragedy is essentially relational. Additionally, 
the company offers an open posture supposedly but reacts defensively.
As the sensemaking literature suggests, Samarco's managers are enrolled in the sensemaking about all 
events triggered by and after the collapse of the dam. But so are the others stakeholders interested and communities 
strongly impacted by the event. From the event onwards, individuals collectively develop a narrative about what 
happened, what the next steps will be, who is responsible for. Such narrative influences and is influenced by 
corporate communications, as sustainability reports. Additionally, the narratives developed in CSR sensemaking 
will embrace how the managers will consider coping with future events and designed strategies. The consistency 
present in those reports shows the strategic orientation of the CSR sensemaking, but it is also a constrained set of 
decisions responding to the legal and legitimacy demands from stakeholders. 
Figure 2. The CSR character of Samarco
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Basu and Palazzo (2008, p. 43) and Georgieva (2012, p. 18)
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APPENDIX: GENERAL DATA OF SAMARCO
SAMARCO MINERAÇÃO S.A.
Slogan Development commitment
Type Closed-capital company
Industry Mining
Kind Subsidiary / Corporation
Foundation 1977
Headquarters Belo Horizonte city, Minas Gerais State, Brazil
Shareholders Joint-venture between Vale and BHP Billiton Brazil Ltda. (owned by Anglo-Australian BHP Billiton), each with 50% of the shares of the company
Predecessor company Anonymous society Mineradora Trindade (SAMITRI)
Official site www.samarco.com
Units
Samarco’s structure includes one concentration plant, two pelletizing plants, a 
pipeline, and its own sea terminal. The starting point of Samarco´s production 
process is in Germano Mine, in an open-pit mine with mineral resources of 
3.5 billion tons of iron ore. The plant is located between the municipalities of 
Mariana and Ouro Preto, in Minas Gerais State, with a production capacity of 
16.5 Mtpa of concentrate. The ore is moved out of the mine across a pipeline 
on nine-km-long conveyor belts which lead to the beneficiation plant. There 
the low-grade itabirite ore is concentrated; in other words, its iron content is 
enhanced by the removal of impurities. The resulting material is mixed with 
water, at a proportion of 70% solids and 30% water, forming a slurry, whose 
consistency lets it be conveyed through a pipeline all the way to the coast 
in Ponta Ubu city, Espírito Santo State. The Ponta Ubu complex consists of 
two pellet plants, where the arriving slurry is dewatered and transformed 
into pellets, which are stockpiled and then carried by conveyor belts to the 
company’s own port facilities for out shipment.
Products Iron ore pellets
Employment generation About 2,969 
Gross revenue US$ 2.8 million
Sales Exported 25.3 million tons (pellets and  fines)
Net profit US$ 1.1 million
Production 25.1 million tons of pellet produced
Production cost US$ 57.11 (unit cost per ton of pellet sold)
Investments US$ 489 million euros (operations)
Social Investments US$ 3.9 million (volunteer in the community)
Environment Investments US$ 33 million
Gross Value Added US$ 1.6 million
Net Value Added US$ 1.5 million
Asset US$ 7.4 billion
Equity US$ 1.6 billion
Dividends US$ 1.0 million (paid to shareholders)
Taxes US$ 225 million in taxes generated in Germano (MG), Ubu (ES) and pipeline from 2011 to 2014
Production impacts
At least five other episodes of environmental accidents in the structures of the 
levees of the Samarco mining, also known “Bento Rodrigues Case”, and in 
four of these episodes mud leaked out killing fish and paralyzing the uptake 
of water. In addition to these leaks, in 2014, the company was one of those 
responsible for the serious pollution in the capital of Espirito Santo State, 
Vitória city, which resulted in a Parliamentary Investigation called the "Black 
Powder”.
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Samarco’s Financial Statement, published on December 31, 2014.
